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Abstract 
In a rational expectations model, wages and prices should respond more to shocks in currency 
unions than under adjustable pegs because of the absence of exchange rate adjustment.  This 
is an aspect of the endogeneity of the optimum currency area criteria that has been largely 
ignored. Empirical evidence from three currency unions tends to suggest some degree of 
endogeneity of price flexibility, but the rate of adjustment is slow.  Self-selection into 
currency unions by countries with naturally greater price flexibility does not appear to be a 
significant factor. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Robert Mundell opens his seminal 1961 paper on optimum currency areas with the following 
statement:  “[I]t is patently obvious that periodic balance of payments crises will remain an 
integral feature of the international economic system as long as fixed exchange rates and rigid 
wage and price levels prevent the terms of trade from fulfilling a natural role in the adjustment 
process.”  The literature has emphasised the importance of international linkages between 
regions through the extent of trade, symmetry of shocks, labour mobility and fiscal transfer 
mechanisms as criteria for a currency union. Frankel and Rose (1997) added a new twist to the 
debate by noting the endogeneity of some of these criteria, showing that the formation of a 
currency union itself tended to increase intra-union trade and the symmetry of shocks.  Yet 
Mundell’s paper, as the quote above makes clear, is not about fixed exchange rates as such, but 
about fixed exchange rates combined with rigid wages and prices.  This second element has 
figured relatively little in subsequent discussion, no doubt because the existence of these 
nominal rigidities is taken for granted. 
An important component of modern economic theory, the rational expectations 
assumption, implies that nominal rigidities will not be entirely determined by the institutional 
structure of labour and product markets; rather, they will be endogenous to macroeconomic 
policy, and in particular to the exchange rate regime in place.  Price-setters are likely to behave 
differently when faced with a government firmly committed to a fixed exchange rate to how 
they would if the government were known to be willing to adjust the exchange rate after prices 
have been set.  If currency unions were to induce significantly greater wage and price flexibility 
through the exchange rate commitment, that would reduce the employment effects of region-
specific shocks and absorb some of the pressure that would otherwise fall on other adjustment 
mechanisms.  In other words, the point about the endogeneity of the optimum currency area 
criteria may also apply to wage and price rigidity.  There has been very little empirical work 
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on this issue in general, although it has been an important element of the discussion and analysis 
of the crisis in the euro area. 
Recent history does not support the view that currency unions are immune from shocks that 
require internal adjustment.  In the euro area, for example, large capital flows from the centre 
to the periphery collapsed after the global financial crisis, leaving internal real exchange rates 
severely misaligned (Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon, 2010; Shambaugh, 2012).  If nominal 
rigidities obstruct the required internal price adjustment, the resulting output losses may 
precipitate a flight from a country’s assets, particularly if the banking system is also exposed 
to significant losses, as in the euro area.1  In second-generation models of currency crises (e.g. 
Obstfeld, 1996), a crisis can be precipitated if agents perceive that there is a limit to the output 
cost that the authorities are willing to bear in defence of the currency.  The same can happen in 
a currency union, because a severe crisis is likely to put the possibility of leaving the union and 
devaluing back on the political agenda. 
The general perception of the Eurozone crisis is that adjustment in the periphery has been 
far too slow to prevent large output losses (Eichengreen et al., 2014; Gibson et al., 2014; 
Honkapohja, 2014).  Ireland may be the poster boy of post-crisis adjustment, having achieved 
a substantial reduction in relative unit labour costs, but it is regarded as very much the exception 
that proves the rule (OECD, 2016; Whelan, 2014). 
This paper addresses the issue of adjustment within a currency union.  If an individual 
member country’s wages and prices get too high relative to those of the other members, the 
situation can only be corrected by adjustment of relative wages and prices.  This is the question 
that is addressed here: is there more internal wage and price adjustment in currency unions than 
                                                          
1 For a model of the interaction between banking and currency crises, see Bleaney et al. (2008). 
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under other exchange rate regimes, because of the disciplinary effect of the fixed exchange 
rate?  Perhaps surprisingly, there has been virtually no formal investigation of this issue. 
In a rational expectations model, as mentioned above and shown below, wage- and price-
setters should be more willing to adjust wages and prices under hard pegs, because the nominal 
exchange rate is known to be fixed.  The results of our empirical analysis show that, under 
floating or soft pegs, adjustment works more or less exclusively through the nominal exchange 
rate, and price adjustment is small.  In currency unions, as the model predicts, price adjustment 
is somewhat greater, but still slow: a ten percent difference in the level of the real effective 
exchange rate is estimated to be associated with a relative price movement of less than one 
percent per annum, using consumer prices, and somewhat faster using GDP deflators. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  A theoretical model is presented in Section Two.  
The empirical model is laid out and data issues discussed in Section Three, and empirical results 
are presented in Section Four.  Section Five concludes. 
 
II. AN ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL 
The aim of this section is to present a simple model that captures the idea that, under rational 
expectations, fixing the exchange rate alters the response of prices to a negative shock.  In the 
model presented below, the economy is populated by a set of n monopolistically competitive 
individual producers of a single differentiated good, as in the sticky-price model of Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1996, Ch. 10).  Producers like higher output and higher prices, but demand is a 
declining function of the real exchange rate. The government likes higher output and also a 
higher nominal exchange rate (to keep inflation down).  The demand curve is subject to a 
stochastic shock that is observed by all agents. 
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The main results are as follows.  With a fixed exchange rate, a negative demand shock 
induces producers to reduce prices, but the government cannot adjust the exchange rate to 
further protect output.  With an adjustable peg, under a negative shock the government sets the 
exchange rate lower than they otherwise would, and after producers have set prices, but 
producers anticipate this and consequently set prices higher than they would in the currency 
union case. 
The model is in the tradition of Barro and Gordon (1983), in the sense that the 
government’s preferences incorporate an ambitious output target that generates an inflation 
bias.  The deviation of (the log of) output per producer (y) from its “natural” level (?̅?) is a 
decreasing function of (the log of) the real exchange rate (p+e), adjusted for a zero-mean 
stochastic demand shock (z), where p is the log of the price level, e is the log of the nominal 
exchange rate (foreign currency units per unit of domestic currency, so that an increase 
represents an appreciation of the domestic currency) and foreign prices are fixed at one (so 
their logarithm is zero): 
𝑦 = ?̅? − 𝜃(𝑝 + 𝑒) + 𝑧         (1) 
The producers maximise profit (𝜋) subject to increasing marginal costs: 
𝜋 = (𝑝 − 𝑎)𝑦 − 𝑏(𝑦 − ?̅?)2     𝑎, 𝑏 > 0   (2) 
The government cares about output and price stability, and has a target level of output 
per producer of ?̃?.  In order to maintain the one-period nature of the model, the desire for price 
stability is represented as the government’s preference for a higher nominal exchange rate, so 
that imported inflation is lower.  The government’s loss function is: 
𝐿𝑔 =
1
2
(?̃? − 𝑦)2 +
1
2
(?̃? − 𝑒)2         (3) 
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where ?̃? represents the government’s exchange rate target. 
The order of events in each period is as follows.  First the demand shock, z, is 
determined and observed by all agents.  Then the producers set prices, taking the expected 
exchange rate into account. Finally the government sets the exchange rate, if it is free to do so.  
Substituting from (1) into (2) yields: 
𝜋 = 𝑝?̅? + 𝑝𝑧 − 𝜃𝑝(𝑝 + 𝑒) − 𝑎?̅? − 𝑎𝑧 + 𝑎𝜃𝑝 − 𝑏𝑧2 − 𝑏𝜃2(𝑝 + 𝑒)2 + 2𝑏𝑧𝜃(𝑝 + 𝑒) (4) 
 
A currency union 
Consider first the case of a currency union.  Since the exchange rate is fixed, the reaction of 
prices to the demand shock may be obtained by partially differentiating (4) with respect to p: 
𝜕𝜋 𝜕𝑝 = ?̅? + 𝑧 − 2𝜃𝑝⁄ − 𝜃𝑒 + 𝑎𝜃 − 2𝑏𝜃2(𝑝 + 𝑒) + 2𝑏𝜃𝑧     (5) 
Since the second derivative is negative, profits are maximized when (5) is equal to zero, or: 
(2𝜃 + 2𝑏𝜃2)𝑝 = ?̅? − 𝜃𝑒 + 𝑎𝜃 − 2𝑏𝜃𝑒 + (1 + 2𝑏𝜃)𝑧     (6) 
The reaction of prices to a demand shock is given by differentiating (6) with respect to z: 
𝜕𝑝 𝜕𝑧 = (
1
2𝜃
)(1 +⁄ (𝑏𝜃/(1 + 𝑏𝜃)))        (7) 
 
An adjustable peg 
In the case of an adjustable peg, e can be adjusted after prices have been set.  Since the 
producers have full information about the government’s loss function, however, under rational 
expectations they can calculate the exchange rate that will be chosen. Writing 𝑘 = (?̃? − ?̅?) >
0, the first-order condition for the government’s problem is: 
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𝜕𝐿𝑔
𝜕𝑒
= 𝜃[𝑘 + 𝜃(𝑝 + 𝑒) − 𝑧] − [?̃? − 𝑒] = 0                (8) 
which yields the solution 
(1 + 𝜃2)𝑒 = ?̃? − 𝜃𝑘 − 𝜃2𝑝 + 𝜃𝑧        (9) 
And the real exchange rate is: 
(1 + 𝜃2)(𝑝 + 𝑒) = ?̃? − 𝜃𝑘 + 𝑝 + 𝜃𝑧      (10) 
If producers set higher prices, the government chooses a lower nominal exchange rate, but the 
real exchange rate is higher.  It is shown in Appendix 1 that substituting from (1) and (10) into 
(2) and solving for the maximum price as in the currency-union case yields: 
𝜕𝑝 𝜕𝑧 = (
1
2𝜃
)(1 +⁄ (𝑏𝜃/(1 + 𝑏𝜃 + 𝜃2)))      (11) 
which is smaller than in the currency union case because of the additional 𝜃2  term in the 
denominator. 
Equation (11) implies that prices adjust less in response to a shock under an adjustable 
peg than in a currency union.  The output response in the two cases depends on whether this 
difference in price response is more than offset by the exchange rate response. Differentiating 
(10) with respect to z, we find that under an adjustable peg the response of the real exchange 
rate is: 
𝜕(𝑝 + 𝑒) 𝜕𝑧 = 𝜕𝑝 𝜕𝑧 + 𝜃 (1 + 𝜃2)⁄⁄⁄      (12) 
It is shown in Appendix 1 that this is always greater than in the currency union case, which 
means that the output effects of a shock are smaller under an adjustable peg.  
Summary 
In a rational expectations model, prices exhibit more flexibility in response to shocks in a 
currency union than under an adjustable peg, but the real exchange rate adjusts less and output 
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is more affected by the shock, because the nominal exchange rate cannot perform the role of a 
shock absorber. 
  
III. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
Several predictions emerge from the model.  One is that prices are more sensitive to shocks in 
currency unions than under adjustable pegs.  A second prediction is that the real exchange rate 
is less sensitive to shocks in currency unions than under adjustable pegs, because in the latter 
case the adjustment in nominal exchange rates outweighs the lower sensitivity of prices.  We 
concentrate on these two predictions; a third prediction – that output is more sensitive to shocks 
under a currency union – has been addressed elsewhere (e.g. Ghosh et al., 2015). 
 How should shocks be represented empirically? Since we want them to reflect an 
exchange rate disequilibrium, we use the lagged real effective exchange rate as a measure of 
this disequilibrium. 
We initially estimate the following equation: 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑐∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡    (13)  
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the consumer price index in country i in year t, 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the same thing for country 
i’s anchor currency, R is the real effective exchange rate index (an increase representing an 
appreciation), RA is the real effective exchange index of the anchor currency,  is the first-
difference operator, a is a country fixed effect, w is a time fixed effect and v is a random error.  
Equation (13) expresses inflation relative to that in the anchor currency as a function of the 
lagged level of the real exchange rate of country i, and of the change in the real effective 
exchange rate of the anchor currency. If b > 0, then there is price adjustment relative to the 
anchor currency in response to the lagged level of the country’s real effective exchange rate.  
In an alternative formulation we replace the consumer price index by the GDP deflator. 
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 There is a possibility of endogeneity bias even though the real exchange rate regressor 
is lagged (Reed, 2015) that is not easily addressed, as we discuss below.  To the extent that the 
focus of the analysis is more on a comparison of estimated coefficients across regimes than on 
the absolute value, bias is less of a problem provided that it is fairly consistent across countries, 
but that is a conjecture. 
There are three currency unions in our analysis: the euro area, the African Financial 
Community (CFA) and the East Caribbean Currency Authority (ECCA).  The identification of 
other pegs and floats is derived from the exchange rate flexibility index of Bleaney and Tian 
(2017).2 Some assumptions have to be made about the anchor currency for countries outside a 
currency union.  We assume it to be the euro for all countries in Europe, and also for the CFA 
zone, since the CFA franc is pegged to the euro. Since the euro is a floating currency, but area-
wide price and real effective exchange rate indices are available, the euro area as a whole is 
treated as the anchor currency for individual member countries.  In all other cases the US dollar 
is treated as the nominal anchor.  The anchor currency prices are either US prices (if the US 
dollar is the anchor) or prices for the euro area. 
Annual data for 186 countries (listed in Appendix 2) over the period 1980 to 2014 are used 
(1999 to 2014 for the euro area and the CFA zone), and are mostly drawn from IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS).3 The GDP deflators are from the IMF World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) database, and price indices for the euro area from OECD Economic Outlook.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
After some preliminary data analysis, in this section some regression results are presented for 
price adjustment under different exchange rate regimes, based on equation (13) or variants 
                                                          
2 This classification is chosen because of its data coverage. An index of less than 0.01 is treated as a peg, and an 
index of greater than 0.01 is treated as a float.  
3 Data before 1999 are not used for the CFA zone because of the large devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994. 
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thereof.  Some tests of whether the results might be the effect of self-selection by countries 
with intrinsically lower price rigidity into currency unions are incorporated. This is followed 
by some analysis of exchange rate adjustment. 
It is useful to disaggregate the volatility of the real effective exchange rate of a member 
of a currency union into separate elements.  Let R be the log of the real effective exchange rate 
of the country, N the log of its nominal effective exchange rate, and P and PF respectively the 
log of domestic prices and of the trade-weighted average of foreign prices (PA and PFA 
respectively for the anchor currency).  By the definition of R, 
R = N + P – PF                  (14) 
 and for the anchor currency (A), 
RA= NA + PA – PFA                  (15) 
Subtracting (16) from (15) and taking first differences yields: 
R = RA + (N – NA) + (P – PA) – (PF – PFA)             (16) 
So real exchange rate movements (R) can be decomposed into (1) real effective exchange rate 
changes of the anchor currency (RA); (2) nominal effective exchange rate changes relative to 
the anchor currency (N – NA), which can only happen (in the absence of a currency union 
devaluation) because of differences in trade weights; (3) inflation relative to the anchor 
currency (P – PA); and (4) differences in trade-weighted foreign inflation, which again is a 
matter of weights.  The second and last terms are the effect of different trading partner weights 
between the member of the currency union and the anchor currency. 
 Table 1 shows that real exchange rate volatility of the anchor currency (RA) has 
tended to be more important than inflation differentials (P – PA) to the real exchange rate 
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volatility of currency union members.  This suggests that the exogenous shocks assumed in the 
model have been a significant component of real exchange rate volatility in currency unions. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
Real Effective Exchange Rate Volatility in Currency Unions 
 
Standard deviation ECCA 
1980-2014 
CFA 
1999-2014 
Euro Area 
1999-2014 
R 0.0414 0.0461 0.0268 
RA 0.0571 0.0579 0.0540 
N – NA 0.0495 0.0273 0.0312 
P – PA 0.0182 0.0297 0.0108 
PF – PFA 0.0383 0.0104 0.0055 
Observations 204 192 226 
Anchor currency US dollar euro Euro 
Notes:  Data are annual. R (RA): change in log of real effective exchange rate of member 
countries (anchor currency).  N (NA): change in log of nominal effective exchange rate of 
member countries (anchor currency).  P (PA): change in log of consumer price index of 
member countries (anchor currency).  PF (PFA): trade-weighted average of change in log 
of trading partners’ consumer price indices of member countries (anchor currency).   
  
 
In the remainder of this paper we investigate whether the price level of member 
countries responds to the level of the lagged real effective exchange rate.  The model in Section 
II predicts that the response will be stronger in currency unions than in soft pegs. 
Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation (13) separately for currency unions, 
other pegs and floats, and then for the three currency unions individually, using the price index 
and real effective exchange rate (REER) index of the euro area for the CFA and for individual 
euro-area countries, and of the US dollar for the ECCA. Standard errors are clustered by 
country.  For currency unions the point estimate of the coefficient of the lagged REER is -
0.0639, with a t-statistic of -2.23, whereas for other pegs the coefficient is only -0.0111, with 
a t-statistic of -1.59.  Thus in currency unions there is a significant negative correlation between 
the lagged REER and consumer price inflation relative to the anchor currency.  This is 
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consistent with the predictions of the model, but it also implies that adjustment to real exchange 
rate shocks is slow: the effect on relative inflation rates of a 10 percent difference in the real 
exchange rate is estimated to be less than 0.7 percent p.a.  However this compares with a 
relative inflation effect of only about 0.1% p.a. in other exchange rate regimes. 
In the individual currency unions the picture varies quite considerably, with a lagged 
REER coefficient of -0.1283 for the euro area, -0.0829 for the CFA zone, and -0.0266 for the 
ECCA.  Thus price adjustment seems to be fastest in the euro area. 
In Table 3 we estimate a less parsimonious model of inflation as follows: 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑓∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑔∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡 +
𝑣𝑖𝑡          (17) 
In equation (17) the coefficient of the anchor country’s inflation rate is no longer 
constrained to be equal to one, and lagged inflation and lagged real exchange rate movements 
are added to the equation.  There is a potential problem of bias because the equation contains 
both country fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable.  Because the time series dimension 
(T) of the data is long (over thirty years in most cases), and the bias is less when the time span 
is long, the bias should be relatively small.  Although instrumental variables techniques can be 
used to address this bias, they are likely to involve considerable loss of efficiency. 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (17).   For currency unions, both as a 
whole and individually, anchor currency inflation is highly significant with a coefficient 
exceeding but not very far from one, which implies that the Table 2 model is not unreasonable.  
The lagged REER coefficients are similar to those in Table 2, with a point estimate of -0.0608 
(and a t-statistic of -2.07) for currency unions, -0.0064 (-1.53) for other pegs and -0.0076 (-
1.30) for floats.  For individual currency unions the lagged REER coefficient is similar to that 
shown in Table 2, which is perhaps an indication that any bias is small. 
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The models estimated so far assume that, apart from the lagged dependent variable, the 
explanatory variables are exogenous.  This seems reasonable: they are either predetermined, 
because they relate to the previous period, or if not they are anchor-currency variables, and 
therefore relate to a much larger economy (the United States or the Euro Area).   Thus one form 
of endogeneity, a feedback effect from the dependent variable to the independent variables, 
should not be a major concern here. A different sort of endogeneity issue is that countries with 
lower price rigidity might self-select into currency unions, so that the estimated parameters 
overstate the effect of a given country joining a customs union.  In this case it is not that the 
parameters are subject to simultaneous equation bias, but that their interpretation depends on 
how currency union (CU) membership is determined.  If any difference between currency 
unions and other regimes is in fact the effect of self-selection, then there is no evidence that 
currency unions change agents’ behaviour, as the model above predicts. 
The question is how to test for self-selection.  Prices of primary products tend to be 
more flexible than other prices, so countries where primary products are more important may 
have fewer nominal rigidities.  It is also true that currency unions are geographically 
concentrated, and other countries in the same region are likely to be reasonably similar in 
income levels and economic structure.  For example, taking figures for the year 2010, the share 
of agriculture in GDP in the CFA zone averaged 28.8 percent, similar to 28.0 per cent for the 
rest of West Africa.  For the euro zone the figure was 1.9 percent, and for the rest of Europe 
6.4 percent; for the ECCA and the rest of the Caribbean the figures were respectively 5.5 
percent and 2.7 percent.  If we assume that there are regional differences in price rigidity, then 
under the self-selection hypothesis non-CU members in the same region as a CU should have 
higher price rigidity than CU members in the same region (since they have chosen not to join), 
but lower price rigidity than non-CU countries in other regions (where the lack of a CU suggests 
greater price rigidity).  This can be tested by separating out non-CU countries in the same 
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region as a CU from other non-CU countries.  If the self-selection argument is correct, the 
difference should be significant (although non-CU countries in the same region as a CU may 
still have greater price rigidity than CU members, which might explain why they have not 
joined the CU). 
Accordingly, in Table 4, we pool the data and treat non-CU members in Europe, West 
Africa or the Caribbean as a separate group (defined as Z = 1). The regression reported in Table 
4 is equivalent to Table 2 estimated across the full sample but with coefficients allowed to 
differ between CU members, non-CU members in the same regions (Z=1), pegs and floats.  
The omitted category is pegs for which Z=0, and the lagged real exchange rate coefficient for 
them is -0.0090.  The lagged real exchange rate coefficient interacted with the float dummy 
has a coefficient of +0.0110, which is significant at the five percent level and measures the 
estimated difference relative to the omitted category.  The lagged real exchange rate interacted 
with Z has a coefficient of -0.0114, indicating slightly more price flexibility than countries with 
the same regime in regions where there is no currency union, but it is not statistically 
significant.  For currency unions, however, the difference in the lagged real exchange rate 
coefficient is about five times greater, at -0.0552, and is significant at the five percent level.  
This suggests that the estimated CU effect is not a self-selection effect. 
Table 5 repeats Table 3 using relative GDP deflators rather than consumer prices; GDP 
deflators cover a wider range of goods and include exports rather than imports.  Relative GDP 
deflators are substantially more volatile than relative consumer prices, and this is reflected in 
higher root mean square errors, particularly in the case of the CFA zone. For currency unions 
as a group (column 1), the point estimate of the lagged REER coefficient is in every case 
somewhat more negative than in Table 3, at -0.1017 compared with -0.0608 in Table 3, but is 
no longer significant at the five per cent level.  Looking at currency unions individually 
(columns 4 to 6), the pattern is similar to Table 3, but for ECCA the point estimate of the lagged 
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REER coefficient is actually significantly positive, at +0.0669.  For the CFA zone, this 
coefficient is more than 100 percent more negative than in Table 3 (-0.1867 compared with -
0.0740), although it is still not significant at the five percent level.  For the euro area, the lagged 
REER coefficient is 40 % larger than in Table 3 (-0.2124 compared with -0.1116) and highly 
statistically significant.  This is consistent with Tressel and Wang’s (2014) finding that 
different measures produce different estimates of the degree of REER adjustment in the euro 
area.  
In Table 5 the lagged real exchange rate coefficients for other pegs (column 2) and 
floats (column 3) are still much less negative than those for currency unions, although 
somewhat more negative than in Table 2, and significant at the one percent level in the case of 
other pegs. 
A common explanation for slow price adjustment is the existence of nominal rigidities, 
and particularly resistance to falls in prices and wages.   If rigidities are particularly strong in 
a downward direction, then adjustment should be slower for negative shocks, which require 
price falls, than for positive ones.  This suggests that nominal rigidities should be reflected in 
asymmetries in the adjustment process.  Some tests of this are reported in the working paper 
version of this article (Bleaney and Yin, 2015); no significant asymmetries were found. 
 
Exchange rate adjustment 
The model suggests that in adjustable pegs the exchange rate will be used to cushion the effect 
of pegs on output.  Table 6 looks at nominal and real exchange rate adjustment relative to the 
US dollar for soft pegs and floats, with the same explanatory variables as used for relative price 
adjustment in Table 2.  The sample is confined to non-European countries, since European 
countries are more likely to be pegged to the euro, and also to observations with inflation in 
the range -10 % to +10 %. The estimated equation is: 
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∆𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡       (18) 
where EUS is the bilateral exchange rate against the U.S. dollar (U.S. dollars per unit of country 
i’s currency). 
The coefficient of the lagged REER in Table 6 is negative, as expected, and much more 
so for floats than for other pegs.  For other pegs the point estimate of the lagged real exchange 
rate coefficient is -0.0264 with a t-statistic of -1.71 for nominal rates, and -0.0455 with a t-
statistic of -2.52, for real rates. These numbers are quite low, suggesting only limited use of the 
exchange rate as a shock absorber. 
 
Summary 
Our results indicate some statistically significant relative price adjustment in response to real 
exchange shocks for the typical currency-union member country. Using consumer prices, the 
estimated price elasticity varies considerably across the three customs unions from –11.2% in 
the euro area to –7.4% in the CFA zone and –2.3% in ECCA. When GDP deflators are used 
rather than consumer prices, the estimated adjustment of prices to real exchange rate shocks is 
about twice as large in every case except that of the ECCA, for which the sign is unexpectedly 
positive.  For adjustable pegs and floats the elasticity of relative prices with respect to the real 
exchange rate is very small (of the order of –1% for consumer prices and –2% for GDP 
deflators) and usually not statistically significant, which indicates a reliance on the adjustment 
of nominal exchange rates. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Our theoretical model predicts that agents change their behaviour because of the exchange-rate 
commitment of a currency union, so that price rigidity is endogenous to the exchange rate 
regime.  Potentially this is an important, but neglected, aspect of the endogeneity of the 
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optimum currency area criteria. Whether this effect is significant in practice is an empirical 
question. 
Our results suggest some evidence for such an effect. Under adjustable pegs, relative 
price adjustment in response to real exchange rate shocks is negligible; in currency unions, 
where nominal exchange rate adjustment is ruled out, relative price adjustment is statistically 
significant but nevertheless still quite slow in economic terms, with a ten percent higher real 
exchange rate being associated with a consumer price differential of less than one percent in 
the subsequent year.  Adjustment is faster in the euro area than in other currency unions.  These 
figures suggest that the limited endogeneity of price rigidity to the exchange rate regime 
implied by our results does little to diminish the relevance of other criteria for an optimum 
currency area, such as the absence of asymmetric shocks. 
An alternative explanation of our results is that only countries with low price rigidity 
join currency unions.  It is difficult to rule out this possibility, but we have attempted to test it 
by assuming that there is significant regional variation in price rigidity.  Then, if countries in 
regions with low price rigidity are more likely to join currency unions, other countries in the 
same region should have lower price rigidity than those in regions with no currency union.  We 
find little evidence of such a pattern. 
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Appendix 1   
 
1) Derivation of equation (11). 
 
Starting from equation (4): 
 
 
𝜋 = 𝑝?̅? + 𝑝𝑧 − 𝜃𝑝(𝑝 + 𝑒) − 𝑎?̅? − 𝑎𝑧 + 𝑎𝜃𝑝 − 𝑏𝑧2 − 𝑏𝜃2(𝑝 + 𝑒)2 + 2𝑏𝑧𝜃(𝑝 + 𝑒), 
 
We can use equation (10) to make the following substitutions: 
 
𝜃𝑝(𝑝 + 𝑒) =
𝜃(?̃?−𝜃𝑘)+𝜃𝑝2+𝜃2𝑝𝑧
(1+𝜃2)
       (A1) 
 
2𝑏𝑧𝜃(𝑝 + 𝑒) =
2𝑏𝑧𝜃(?̃?−𝜃𝑘)+2𝑏𝑧𝜃𝑝+2𝑏𝜃2𝑧2
(1+𝜃2)
      (A2) 
 
−𝑏𝜃2(𝑝 + 𝑒)2 =
−𝑏𝜃2𝑝2−2𝑏𝜃3𝑧𝑝
(1+𝜃2)2
 + irrelevant terms     (A3) 
 
Then  differentiating with respect to p yields 
 
(1 + 𝜃2)2 (
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝
) = (1 + 𝜃2)2𝑧 − (2𝜃𝑝 + 𝜃2𝑧 + 2𝑏𝜃𝑧)(1 + 𝜃2) − 2𝑏𝜃2𝑝 − 2𝑏𝜃3𝑧  
      + irrelevant terms   (A4) 
 
Setting (A4) equal to zero yields the solution: 
 
2𝜃(1 + 𝜃2 + 𝑏𝜃)𝑝 = (1 + 𝜃2 + 2𝑏𝜃)𝑧 + irrelevant terms    (A5) 
 
From which equation (11) follows. 
 
 
2) Proof of larger real exchange rate response to shocks under an adjustable peg. 
Substituting (11) into (12) for an adjustable peg (AP) yields: 
 
𝐴𝑃 =  [𝜕(𝑝 + 𝑒) 𝜕𝑧]𝐴𝑃 = (
1
2𝜃
)(1 +⁄ (𝑏𝜃/(1 + 𝑏𝜃 + 𝜃2))) +  𝜃 (1 + 𝜃2)⁄  (A6) 
 
Whereas from (7) under a currency union (CU), it is: 
 
𝐶𝑈 = [𝜕(𝑝 + 𝑒) 𝜕𝑧]𝐶𝑈 = [𝜕𝑝/𝜕𝑧]𝐶𝑈 = (
1
2𝜃
)(1 +⁄ (𝑏𝜃/(1 + 𝑏𝜃)))  (A7) 
 
Subtracting (A7) from (A6) yields 
 
𝐴𝑃 − 𝐶𝑈 = − (
1
2𝜃
) [(𝑏𝜃3 (1 + 𝑏𝜃)(1 + 𝑏𝜃 + 𝜃2)] +⁄ 𝜃/(1 + 𝜃2) 
 
= (
1
2
) [(2𝜃 + 2𝑏2𝜃3 + 3𝑏𝜃2 + 2𝜃3 + 𝑏𝜃4] [(1 + 𝑏𝜃)(1 + 𝑏𝜃 + 𝜃2)(1 + 𝜃2)] > 0⁄  
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Appendix 2.  Countries in the Sample 
 
 
Table A1. Sample of Countries and Groups (listed by 2012 exchange rate regime) 
Currency Unions (37) 
Euro area (17) 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Finland, Greece (since 2001), Ireland, Malta (since 2008), Portugal, 
Spain, Cyprus (since 2008), Slovak Republic (since 2009), Estonia, 
Slovenia (since 2007); 
CFA (14) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo; 
East Caribbean (6) 
Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines; 
Soft Pegs (92) 
Albania, Angola, Anguilla, Argentina, Aruba, Republic of Azerbaijan, 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cabo 
Verde, Cambodia, P.R. China: Hong Kong, P.R. China: Macao, P.R. 
China: Mainland, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Curaçao and St Maarten, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Guinea, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, 
Maldives, Micronesia, Montenegro, Montserrat, Morocco, Myanmar, 
Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Peru, Qatar, Rwanda,  São Tomé and Príncipe, Samoa, Saudi 
Arabia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Republic of Yemen; 
Floats (52) 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Republic of 
Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, New 
Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Republic of Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, 
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay, Zambia. 
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TABLE 2 
 
Consumer Price Inflation Relative to the Anchor Currency and Lagged Real Effective Exchange Rates 
 
 Exchange rate regime Individual currency union 
 Currency union Other peg Float CFA Euro area ECCA 
       
Estimation 
method: 
Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE 
RA 
 
-0.0649*** 
(-2.71) 
     
R(-1) -0.0639** 
(-2.23) 
-0.0111 
(-1.59) 
-0.0097** 
(-2.43) 
-0.0829 
(-1.28) 
-0.1283*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.0266 
(-0.65) 
       
Sample size 602 1630 897 190 226 186 
No. countries 37 136 111 14 17 6 
RMSE 0.0183 0.0222 0.0198 0.0238 0.0088 0.0160 
Notes:  Time and country fixed effects included throughout. Dependent variable is change in log of consumer price index of member country 
relative to the anchor currency (P – PA). RA: change in log of real effective exchange rate of anchor currency.  R:  log of real effective 
exchange rate of member country.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics, with standard errors clustered by country. *, 
**, ***: significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels. Annual data 1980-2014 (1999-2014 for CFA and Euro area). For regimes 
other than currency unions, the sample excludes countries with consumer price inflation of more than 10 % or less than -10 %, and the anchor 
currency is the US dollar.  Regime classifications: Bleaney and Tian (2017). 
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TABLE 3 
 
A Less Restrictive Model 
 
 Exchange rate regime Individual currency union 
 Currency union Other peg Float CFA Euro area ECCA 
       
Estimation 
method: 
Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE 
PA 1.045*** 
(3.83) 
-0.552 
(-1.48) 
0.147 
(0.46) 
   
RA 
 
-0.0633*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.0180 
(-1.01) 
-0.0190 
(-0.77) 
   
R(-1) -0.0608** 
(-2.07) 
-0.0064 
(-1.53) 
-0.0076 
(-1.30) 
-0.0740 
(-1.33) 
-0.1116*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.0226 
(-0.59) 
P(-1) -0.0192 
(-0.32) 
0.0795* 
(1.84) 
0.0361 
(0.96) 
-0.1937** 
(-2.15) 
0.3660*** 
(6.38) 
0.122** 
(2.42) 
R(-1) -0.0059 
(-0.20) 
-0.0330** 
(-2.36) 
-0.0053 
(-0.63) 
0.0307 
(0.27) 
-0.0334 
(-0.75) 
0.0198 
(0.22) 
       
Sample size 595 1417 786 189 226 180 
No. countries 37 136 103 14 17 6 
RMSE 0.0183 0.0219 0.0193 0.0234 0.0082 0.0156 
Notes: Time and country fixed effects included throughout.  Dependent variable is change in log of consumer price index of member country 
(P).  RA: change in log of real effective exchange rate of anchor currency.  R:  log of real effective exchange rate of member country. PA: 
change in log of consumer price index of anchor currency.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics, with standard errors 
clustered by country. *, **, ***: significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels. Annual data 1980-2014 (1999-2014 for CFA and 
Euro area). For regimes other than currency unions, the sample excludes countries with consumer price inflation of more than 10 % or less than -
10 %, and the anchor currency is the euro for European countries, and otherwise the US dollar.  Regime classifications: Bleaney and Tian 
(2017). 
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TABLE 4 
 
Testing for endogenous self-selection into currency unions 
 
Dependent variable: Change in log of consumer price index of member country relative to the 
anchor currency 
Estimation method: Two-way FE 
  
RA -0.0387** (-2.31) 
R(-1) -0.0090 (-1.56) 
Currency union dummy (CU) 0.250** (2.43) 
CU*RA -0.0080 (-0.34) 
CU*R(-1) -0.0552** (-2.48) 
Float dummy (FL) -0.0473* (-1.93) 
FL*RA 0.0265 (1.24) 
FL*R(-1) 0.0110** (2.08) 
Z*RA -0.0239 (-1.19) 
Z*R(-1) -0.0114 (-1.13) 
Sample size 2840 
No. countries 167 
RMSE 0.0212 
Notes:  Time and country fixed effects included throughout. Dependent variable is change in log of consumer price index of member country 
(P).  RA: change in log of real effective exchange rate of anchor currency.  R:  log of real effective exchange rate of member country. PA: 
change in log of consumer price index of anchor currency.  Z: dummy =1 for non-CU countries in Europe, West Africa and the Caribbean, and 
=0 otherwise.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics, with standard errors clustered by country. *, **, ***: significantly 
different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels. Annual data 1980-2014 (1999-2014 for CFA and Euro area). For regimes other than currency 
unions, the sample excludescountries with consumer price inflation of more than 10 % or less than -10 %, and the anchor currency is the US 
dollar.  Regime classifications: Bleaney and Tian (2017). 
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TABLE 5 
 
Using GDP Deflators Instead of Consumer Prices 
 
 Exchange rate regime Individual currency union 
 Currency union Other peg Float CFA Euro area ECCA 
       
Estimation 
method: 
Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE 
PA -1.349 
(-0.96) 
-0.178 
(-0.63) 
0.105 
(0.21) 
   
RA 
 
-0.0632 
(-1.21) 
0.0226 
(0.97) 
-0.0189 
(-0.68) 
   
R(-1) -0.1017* 
(-1.92) 
-0.0254*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.0188* 
(-1.85) 
-0.1867* 
(-1.97) 
-0.2124*** 
(-5.20) 
0.0669*** 
(3.07) 
P(-1) -0.1820*** 
(-6.62) 
0.0573** 
(2.33) 
0.0087 
(0.15) 
-0.1772*** 
(-6.67) 
0.3423** 
(2.75) 
-0.1608* 
(-2.36) 
R(-1) 0.0140 
(0.22) 
-0.0114 
(-0.67) 
-0.0015 
(-0.16) 
0.5800* 
(2.12) 
-0.1012* 
(-1.97) 
-0.1869* 
(-2.04) 
       
Sample size 616 1578 820 192 226 198 
No. countries 37 146 109 14 17 6 
RMSE 0.0525 0.0300 0.0233 0.0831 0.0110 0.0275 
Notes:Time and country fixed effects included throughout.  Dependent variable is change in log of the GDP deflator of member country (P).  
RA: change in log of real effective exchange rate of anchor currency.  R:  log of real effective exchange rate of member country. PA: change 
in log of consumer price index of anchor currency.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics, with standard errors clustered 
by country. *, **, ***: significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels. Annual data 1980-2014 (1999-2014 for CFA and Euro area). 
For regimes other than currency unions, the sample excludes countries with rate of change of the GDP deflator of more than 10 % or less than -
10 %, and the anchor currency is the euro for European countries, and otherwise the US dollar.  Regime classifications: Bleaney and Tian 
(2017). 
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TABLE6 
 
Nominal and Real Exchange Rate Adjustment in Other Pegs and Floats 
 
Regime Other pegs Floats 
Dependent variable = change in log exchange 
rate against US dollar 
Nominal Real Nominal Real 
     
R(-1) -0.264* 
(-1.71) 
-0.0455** 
(-2.52) 
-0.1362*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.3839** 
(-2.09) 
     
Sample size 1234 1234 601 601 
No. countries 97 97 75 75 
RMSE 0.600 0.593 0.0893 0.1351 
Notes: Time and country fixed effects included throughout.  Dependent variable is change in the log of either the nominal or the real (CPI-based) 
bilateral nominal exchange rate relative to the US dollar (rise = appreciation of domestic currency), as specified.  R:  log of real effective 
exchange rate of member country.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics, with standard errors clustered by country. *, 
**, ***: significantly different from  zero at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels. Annual data 1980-2014.  The sample excludes European countries and  
countries with consumer price inflation of more than 10 % or less than -10 %.  Regime classifications: Bleaney and Tian (2017). 
 
